This paper considers attacks against machine learning algorithms used in remote sensing applications. The remote sensing domain presents a suite of challenges that are not fully addressed by current research focused on natural image data. In this paper we present a new study of adversarial examples in the context of satellite image classification problems. Using a recently curated data set and associated classifier, we provide a preliminary analysis of adversarial examples in settings where the targeted classifier is permitted multiple observations of the same location over time. While our experiments to date are purely digital, our problem setup incorporates a number of practical considerations that an attacker would need to take into account when mounting physical attacks.
INTRODUCTION
Many modern deep learning systems exhibit a lack of stability to specially-designed "small" perturbations to the signal input space. While what precisely constitutes a "small" perturbation varies by application, it is generally understood to be a modification that leaves the (human-perceived) signal content unchanged while inducing a fundamental change in the output of the targeted machine learning system. Signals containing perturbations designed in this manner are termed adversarial examples (AE) [5, 14, 18, 20] . AE (and their potential real-world implications) have been a topic of substantial recent interest. Despite widespread attention, however, there remain many open questions. For example, while Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). SIGSPATIAL '18, November 6-9, 2018, Seattle, WA, USA © 2018 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-5889-7/18/11. https://doi.org /10.1145/3274895.3274904 analyses into the mathematical properties of AE have been conducted (e.g. [11] [12] [13] ), a complete theoretical understanding of this phenomenon remains elusive. On the more applied end of the spectrum, it is unclear how consistently AE can mislead real-world systems. This question of applicability is broad and depends upon many factors such as a priori knowledge of the targeted system, how and where perturbations can be injected in the signal processing chain, what constraints are placed upon the perturbation, and the required level of robustness to variabilities in signal acquisition (variations in viewpoint, lighting, signal preprocessing, etc.).
A number of studies of AE in physical settings have recently been performed, including [3, 10, 15] . These experiments involve earthbased sensing in the visible spectrum at relatively close ranges, e.g. within the sensing range of the camera on an autonomous vehicle or a facial recognition system. There continues to be some debate regarding practicality of such attacks in real-world applications. For example, in [16] the authors concluded that AE are not a concern for autonomous vehicles since many AE generated from a single anticipated perspective did not preserve their adversarial properties when perceived from other viewpoints. However, [3] subsequently demonstrated that, by explicitly accounting for the anticipated distribution of viewpoints (and other variations in the sensing process), it is indeed possible to construct robust AE and therefore the phenomenon merits consideration. Explicitly defending against adversarial attacks has also been considered in the literature with varying degrees of success; for a few examples see [1, 2, 5] and references therein.
Physical attacks against typical remote sensing (RS) modalities (e.g. satellite imagery, multi-spectral data, LIDAR, and SAR) have not yet been well-studied. Since the digital manifestation of these signals is typically image-like, much of the existing work in AE is applicable. However, fundamental differences between RS and ground-based sensing introduce important, unique considerations when one considers physical realizations of AE.
Our research goal is to investigate challenges associated with designing physical AE in the RS setting. In addition to outlining these challenges in more detail, we provide a specific approach for digitally designing AE with physical considerations in mind. This paper makes the following novel contributions: (1) as far as the authors are aware, this is first empirical study of AE for satellite imagery, (2) we propose an approach for digitally designing physically realizable AE by explicitly incorporating RS metadata directly into the optimization process, (3) we consider the implications of attacking signals whose fundamental characteristics are changing over time (as might occur in land use classification problems), and (4) we empirically demonstrate the importance of physical scale to the attack success rate when perturbations are limited in physical extent. In particular, contributions 2-4 also suggest a number of promising directions for future work.
APPROACH 2.1 Remote Sensing Considerations
The remote sensing setting introduces a number of considerations which must be accounted for when considering a physical attack, i.e. the creation of AE by manipulation of the physical world, including (1) Viewpoint Geometry For near-nadir observations from a satellite in low-Earth orbit, variations in range to various objects in the scene are likely to be modest. Nevertheless, AE robustness to scale is an important issue. (2) Atmospheric Effects Unlike machine learning algorithms applied to imagery taken from the surface of the Earth, the performance of algorithms in remote sensing applications is highly susceptible to environmental and atmospheric effects (e.g. illumination, clouds, haze). (3) Temporal Variability An orbiting satellite's ground track will pass through the same spot on the Earth's surface according to a regular schedule (usually several days). However, unlike typical video-based sequential observations, the elements of the scene and the environmental conditions surrounding may change dramatically between revisits (due to seasonal changes in vegetation, human patterns of life, and weather). AE attacks that are not themselves time-varying must be robust to these variations. (4) Physical Scale The scale of a satellite image is orders of magnitude larger than an image taken on the Earth's surface. For example, images taken from the IKONOS satellite can span up to 11.3 km across [9] at sub-meter resolution. AE that subtly perturb entire images are therefore implausible; instead, practical AE will be restricted to perturbing a few regions of modest physical dimension. Constraints on the physical support of AE have been considered in the context of natural images (e.g. [4, 10] ); however, the potentially vast scale coupled with the fact that signal processing algorithms are likely to leverage this context (e.g. see [17] ) presents new challenges. (5) Material/Signature Properties Material and sensor properties also influence how an adversary may be able to manipulate a scene. For example, in multi/hyperspectral imaging, one may not be able to arbitrarily modify the spectral signature of a given pixel. Instead, material mixture models may determine the admissible set of perturbations that can be realized. Additionally, in multi-modal settings (e.g. LI-DAR+EO), there are practical constraints upon how a subset of the scene can be modified jointly in each modality.
Digitally Emulating Physical AE
Unfortunately space limitations preclude a proper review of AE; one nice introduction can be found in [13] and the associated references. Key work related to AE and their physical realizations includes (but is not limited to) [3, 6, 10, 14, 15, 19, 20] . Additional details relating prior work in AE to this paper can be found in [8] .
. . , k − 1} denote a classifier which maps d-dimensional images to a discrete label set of cardinality k. For a given input x ∈ [0, 1] d (an image with pixels scaled to be between 0 and 1) and a target label ℓ ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1} let r ∈ R d denote a perturbation designed to cause the classifier to predict label ℓ; i.e. f (x +r ) = ℓ f (x). We then refer to r as an adversarial perturbation and the resulting signal x + r as an adversarial example. The goal to induce a particular prediction ℓ is termed a targeted attack while an alternative is a non-targeted attack where the adversary's goal is merely to change the original prediction, i.e. f (x + r ) f (x). If all details of the classifier f are known by the adversary, this is often referred to as a white box attack. When details of the classifier are not directly known and must be guessed or estimated via query, this is referred to as a black box attack. Generally speaking, white box attacks tend to be the most difficult to defend against [1] .
In the spirit of [4] , our AE are opaque "patches" that, when applied to satellite imagery, defeat whole image classification algorithms. Our goal is to design digital experiments that are, to the extent possible, representative of the physical setting where attacks would ultimately be realized. The source signals we wish to attack occupy some physical space P whereas the sensed/observed inputs to a classifier have undergone a transform related to the sensing process. We will refer to the sensed input space as O and model the sensing process by a function t : P → O (here we are just giving explicit names to the spaces assumed in the "expectation over transformation" framework of [3] ).
We do not assume access to a complete simulation of P and instead rely on sensed data to design our perturbations. For example, if x ∈ P is a source signal we wish to attack, we must do so by working with t(x) ∈ O. Our approach is to parameterize a physical perturbation r ∈ P and to then solve an optimization problem to design r by computing t(r ) and overlaying this "sensed" representation of r into t(x). Thus, the typical gradient descent procedure designs r by backpropagation through t.
Of course, t is subject to uncertainty and the typical approach is to average over a distribution of transformation functions T . A complementary notion, which we explore here, is to use metadata associated with multiple observations t 1 (x), t 2 (x), . . . , t m (x) and approximate T by means of these explicit samples from the true underlying distribution. For example, ground sample distances provide explicit guidance in terms of how a perturbation r (designed in physical coordinates) must be scaled so that t(r ) is dimensionally consistent with t(x).
Due to the the temporal aspects discussed in section 2.1 the signal x being attacked itself changes from one observation to the next. Thus, our data set reflect variations both due to the sensing process and the evolution of the targeted signal {x 1 , . . . , x m }. We are further assuming that the attacker is not adapting the perturbation r over time but rather must design a single attack that is effective across all the variabilities manifested in {t 1 (x 1 ), . . . , t m (x m )}. This is subtly different from most prior work in physical attacks where the dominant source of variability is associated exclusively with the sensing process. We propose the following optimization for implementing targeted attacks against a sequence of observations
where J is a classification loss and d a penalty term designed to promote visual subtlety. The ⊕ in eq. (1) is used to denote that we overlay the attack onto the sensed image (as opposed to componentwise addition, as is often done for subtle adversarial attacks).
The penalty term d in eq. (1) is another important design consideration. In settings where visual subtlety is desired, one could follow the conventional approach of implementing d via a suitable p-norm. In this case, this would be asking for a perturbation that is generally subtle across a range of observational conditions and variations in {x i }. The feasibility of visual subtlety is therefore somewhat signal dependent.
Ideally, attacks would also be subtle with respect to the 3D geometry of the scene. For example, if the spatial extent of the patch extends beyond the roof of a building or spans regions that are partially obscured/in shadow, it would be ideal if the perturbation r respected these discontinuities. In the absence of a full 3D model of P another approach would be to segment the scenes t(x) and incorporate this structure into the attack model. In our current work we loosely approximate this by adding a second term to d which encourages the attack to respect strong edge structure within an image (as determined by a Canny edge detector).
NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
We base our numerical experiments on the Functional Map of the World (fMoW) data set, a large collection of RGB and multispectral satellite images designed for evaluating land use and facility classification algorithms [7] . The fMoW data set is organized into sequences of images corresponding to multiple observations of the same scene over time. Our interest is in attacking sequences with multiple observations; therefore, we only utilize sequences consisting of 8 or more views/images. For our experiments we use a subset of the high resolution RGB images (and associated satellite metadata) in the fMoW validation split. We only consider images that are correctly classified by the targeted classifier prior to applying any perturbation. Finally, we limit our study to relatively benign sensing conditions (as per our discussion in [8] ). In particular, we use images with mild off-nadir angle (less than 30 degrees), at most modest cloud cover (less than 20 percent of image chip obscured), and sun elevation angles of at least 60 degrees to eliminate more extreme variations in illumination. The resulting experiment includes 66 sequences each having at least 8 admissible views.
The authors of fMoW also developed and analyzed a number of classification models, some of which use exclusively image data while others make use of satellite metadata and/or exploit the sequential nature of the images by using recurrent networks. We attack the classifier designated "CNN-I", which is a fine-tuned variant of DenseNet with no recurrent structure designed for RGB image data. Our choice of CNN-I is justified in this case since the performance of this network is quite close to that of the recurrent alternatives (see table 1 in [7] for more details).
For our experiments, we selected 4 target classes from the fMoW taxonomy: "crop field", "hospital", "office building", and "park". We do not try every possible targeted attack only in order to control the computational expense of our experiments; these four classes were chosen to provide some representation of both urban and rural scenery. This selection was made prior to algorithm evaluation and is therefore not cherry-picked for performance.
Attacks are modeled as a single, opaque, flat, piecewise-constant square surface consisting of n × n elements resulting in n 2 parameters to optimize for each attack. For each image, the attack is placed in the center of the scene (i.e. we do not optimize for patch location). The number of elements and the size, in meters, of each element are experimental parameters that are fixed prior to learning the attack. Note that the attack parameters together with the ground sample distance dictate how many pixels are ultimately perturbed by the attack. For scenes with large ground sample distances, there may be far fewer than n 2 pixels which are modified by the attack. Further implementation details related to our experiments are available in [8] .
Results
Overall attack success rates for six different experiments (covering three different physical attack configurations) are shown in table 1. The table shows the number of parameters used in each dimension of the attack (n) as well as the size of each element within the patch (m/elt.). The first three rows (experiment ids 1-3) provide a baseline result for when an attack is based solely on the first image in a sequence. Numbers reported are misclassification rates post-attack (note that all images used in this study were correctly classified by CNN-I pre-attack). The experiments with ids 4-6 show how the overall attack rate improves if the attacker is privy to the first four images in each sequence. Figure 1 shows, in the case of experiment 6, targeted attack success rates broken down by sequence class label and arranged by relative size of scenes. The color of cell m i, j in the heat map indicates the success rate of attacking sequences with original class j and target class i. Sequences are ordered by size and the horizontal axis denotes the percentage of the overall scene covered by the fixedsize AE (1.0 indicates the attacker can perturb all pixels in the scene). A relationship between size and success rates is evident. Since all images are rescaled to a fixed size by the fMoW preprocessing and our attacks are designed in physical coordinates, larger scenes result in fewer available pixels for the attacker to manipulate. From this figure it is clear that some classes are more readily attacked and success appears to be related to the number of pixels the attacker can manipulate. In the full version of this paper we provide additional empirical support for the hypothesis that attack success rates are indeed associated with the relative size of the attack in the scene (see figure 4 in [8] ). This suggests that carefully designing one or more AE locations may be necessary to attack larger scenes. Figure 2 shows a visual example of how matching strong edges and shadows is encouraged by our choice of d; also clear, is that this does not provide perfect agreement with the 3D geometry of the scene. When additional metadata are available the constraints on the spatial support of the attack could be made more realistic.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented new experiments in developing adversarial examples for satellite imagery classification. We described an approach for simulating physical attacks in the digital space which is unique in our use of metadata to align the attack with remotely Table 1 : Success rates for targeted white box attacks against the fMoW classifier "CNN-I" for six experiments (id 1-6). "attack success rate" indicates the targeted AE success rate (i.e. f (x) = ℓ) while "total error rate" indicates how frequently AE caused the classifier to make any mistake (i.e. f (x + r ) f (x)). sensed data. We also provided preliminary experiments which highlight the importance of physical scale in the AE design process. There is abundant opportunity to enrich these experiments. Promising directions include more realistic simulations of the sensing process, more extensive use of metadata, and broadening the set of sequences under consideration. There is also room to explore a wider space of attack designs, which could include implementing multiple patches, more explicitly accounting for 2D and 3D structure of scenes (e.g. by combining attacks with segmentation results), incorporating different notions of visual subtlety, and exploring the impact of different levels of knowledge about the targeted system on the part of the adversary. More ambitiously, there are interesting questions regarding extensions to other modalities (multi and hyperspectral data, SAR, LIDAR, etc.) and also to settings where multiple sensors are utilized simultaneously. These directions also offer new opportunities for defining constraints related to the physical setting, such as exploiting spectral signature databases and material mixture models to ensure physically realizable perturbations in multi/hyperspectral settings. Finally, there is ultimately a need for physical experimentation.
